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A RESTRAINED PERSPECTIVE ON ACTIVISM
JULES B. GERARD*
Discussing the federal judiciary's role in micromanaging public in-
stitutions requires consideration of three functionally related but theoret-
ically distinct topics: (1) the article III jurisdictional requirement of a
"case or controversy"; (2) the determination whether the plaintiff's
rights, constitutional or statutory, have been violated; and, if so, (3) the
selection of an appropriate remedy. The Chicago discriminatory redis-
tricting case, Ketchum v. Byrne,1 involves the first issue not at all and the
second only indirectly. It therefore provides little opportunity for an ad-
vocate of judicial restraint to comment on the subject of this Symposium.
Hence, after briefly reviewing Ketchum in Part I, I broaden the scope of
the inquiry in Part II.
I.
The factual background of Ketchum painted by Messrs. Colman and
Brody 2 presents an appalling picture. The various plaintiffs clearly were
among those injured by the official defendants' activity/inactivity, and
their claims obviously were adverse to the defendants. The case or con-
troversy issue therefore need not detain us.
Whether the defendants' activity violated some constitutional or
statutory right of plaintiffs requires more discussion. It might be argued
that at least some of that activity, such as deliberately drawing ward
boundaries to deprive minority voters of an established population ma-
jority, violated the fifteenth amendment. Gomillion v. Lightfoot 3 was the
predecessor of (and probable stimulus for) Baker v. Carr,4 which began
federal judicial oversight of electoral processes. Gomillion had relied on
* Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B. 1957, J.D. 1958, Washington University.
1. 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985).
2. Colman & Brody, Ketchum v. Byrne: The Hard Lessons of Discriminatory Redistricting in
Chicago, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 497 (1988) (Messrs. Colman and Brody's article appears in this
symposium issue).
3. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The central issue in Baker v. Carr was whether challenges to voting
district boundaries were nonjusticiable "political questions." Had the Court refused to intervene in
Baker, but let Gomillion stand, the result would have been that such challenges were nonjusticiable
political questions when brought by whites but not when brought by blacks. It is in this sense that
Gomillion was "the probable stimulus for" Baker.
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the fifteenth (rather than the fourteenth) amendment to hold racial gerry-
mandering unconstitutional in at least some circumstances.
Without the Gomillion focus, however, the totality of the defend-
ants' acts in Ketchum violated a constitutional right of the plaintiffs only
if the Supreme Court's one person, one vote interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment in Reynolds v. Sims5 was proper. But Justice
Harlan's dissent in that case demonstrated that the decision was of dubi-
ous constitutional validity at best.6 Moreover, in terms of the sympo-
sium topic, I share the widespread belief that the one person, one vote
standard of Reynolds was devised by the Court deliberately to minimize
(rather than to maximize) judicial intrusion into the electoral processes
that otherwise would have been required by Baker v. Carr. But a short
comment on Ketchum is hardly the place to exhume this constitutional
archeology.
The Ketchum plaintiffs also relied on the Voting Rights Act.7 The
Act was amended in an important respect in 1982, after this litigation
commenced. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,8 the Supreme Court had held
that an electoral process was unconstitutional only if it was proved to
have had a discriminatory purpose; disparate racial results were not
enough. The 1982 amendment to the Act, with its extensive legislative
history, was aimed at changing this rule. The essence of the amendment
was that a violation of the Act would be established if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes... are not equally open to participation by a class of citizens
... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is
one circumstance which may be considered .... 9
If the amendment is interpreted as abolishing the Mobile requirement of
discriminatory purpose and substituting a "results" standard, an argu-
ment might have been made that it would then be unconstitutional. The
claim would be that if the Constitution itself requires a discriminatory
purpose, Congress has no authority to abolish that substantive require-
ment under the pretext of "enforcing" the constitutional provision. It
might have been argued on the other hand that racially discriminatory
5. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. Id. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Professor Shane acknowledges the force of Justice
Harlan's dissent in a related case. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
531, 534 n.9 (1988) (Professor Shane's article appears in this symposium issue).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1988).
8. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (Supp. 1988).
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purpose is such a notoriously difficult fact to prove by direct evidence
that it was.well within Congress' power to provide an easier remedy for
violation by lowering the burden of proof. The claim would be that Con-
gress had not changed the substance of the right but had only provided a
more effective remedy for its enforcement. As even this superficial dis-
cussion suggests, it sometimes is hard to locate the boundary between
defining a violation and selecting a remedy to correct it.
In any event, the Supreme Court seems to have resolved the issue of
constitutionality decisively. Thornburg v. Gingles' ° was one of those
splintered decisions so characteristic of the Burger Court. Divided into
four opinions as the Justices were, however, not a single one of them even
suggested that the Act's substitution of a "results" for a "purpose" stan-
dard was unconstitutional in broad outline; on that point they were
unanimous.
All of the Justices in Thornburg gave meticulous attention to the
factors that Congress had indicated should be canvassed as part of the
"totality of circumstances" that would establish a violation, and they
struggled to give them meaningful content. Thornburg is thus pertinent
to this discussion for a number of reasons. First, it illustrates the truth of
Professor Shane's observation that courts sometimes will be required by
valid legislation to act in non-traditional ways." Second, it supports the
argument of Messrs. Colman and Brody that the Ketchum courts were
unnecessarily timid in their approaches to the remedial phase of that
litigation. 12
Thornburg does not, however, necessarily support the Colman-
Brody argument about the constitutionality of requiring supermajori-
ties. 13 On some arguably analogous matters, such as the significance of
black candidates' successes in elections, the Justices in Thornburg were
closely divided. So that chapter remains to be written.
I know nothing about Chicago, its ward system, and the racial dis-
tribution of its population. From this pit of ignorance, it is impossible to
say whether a more restrained, less activist remedy was available than
the one the federal court approved in Ketchum. Messrs. Colman and
Brody do hint, at one point, that a redistricting map might have been
drawn that was entirely race-neutral. 14 If that is so, I would be prepared
to argue that that map was the only one the courts could legitimately
10. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
11. Shane, supra note 6, at 559.
12. Colman & Brody, supra note 2, at 527-28.
13. Id. at 525-27.
14. Id. at 529 n.171.
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have ordered, provided it consisted of compact voting districts and did
not diminish the existing voting power of racial minorities. But on the
evidence available, it is impossible to claim that the courts were more
interventionist than they should have been in selecting a remedy.
II.
Professors Shane and Strauss both view federal court management
of public institutions to accomplish "policy reform" as desirable,15 or at
least as- "necessary."' 6 In the course of his essay, Professor Shane men-
tions litigation concerning mental health institutions. 17 It seemed en-
tirely appropriate, therefore, to examine the most famous of these cases
in some detail.
A. Jurisdiction
Wyatt v. Stickney 18 began when the Alabama legislature cut the tax
on cigarettes. One result of that action was to reduce substantially the
money available to run Alabama mental health institutions. The original
suit was brought by two groups of plaintiffs: (1) former employees of the
Alabama Mental Health Board who had been laid off because of budget
cuts resulting from the tax cut, and who alleged they had been denied
due process; and (2) guardians of patients in various Alabama facilities
who alleged the care of their wards would become constitutionally inade-
quate as a result of the layoffs. The first group of plaintiffs soon disap-
peared. As the Court of Appeals was later to say: "[F]or reasons not
entirely clear from the record before us, however, the focus of the litiga-
tion soon shifted from the effects of the ... terminations to questions of
the overall adequacy of the treatment afforded at the Alabama state
mental hospitals."' 19 The court was right; the evidence is not conclusive.
But there are enough clues to suggest what was going on.
Professor Strauss perceptively notes that not all official defendants
will be averse to plaintiffs' claims. He writes: "Those within the govern-
ment who advocate reform did not have the power to accomplish their
objective before the lawsuit was brought; but the district judge's deci-
sion-in some cases, the mere fact that the suit was brought-will en-
15. Shane, supra note 6, at 565-66.
16. Strauss, Legality, Activism, and the Patronage Case, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 596 (1988)
(Professor Strauss' article appears in this symposium issue).
17. See Shane, supra note 6, at 566.
18. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), later op., 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), later op., 344
F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), later proceeding, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, re-
manded in part & reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
19. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1308.
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hance their power and may enable their view to prevail." 20 That seems
to describe Stonewall B. Stickney, the principal defendant and then Exec-
utive Officer of the Alabama Mental Health Board, precisely. Having
lost his battle for funding with the Alabama legislature, he seems to have
decided to play a largely passive role in the litigation, hoping (correctly)
that the federal court would order the state to provide what he had been
refused. For example, the defendants' answer to the amended complaint
was as follows: "Defendants agree to be bound by the objective and sub-
jective standards ultimately ordered by this Honorable Court in this
cause . "21
What kind of a lawsuit is that-when a disgruntled state official
whose department is not funded as generously as he would like lets it be
known that he will not resist claims that will result in increased money
for his agency? The answer, of course, is that it is a collusive lawsuit,
which is to say that it is not a legitimate lawsuit, not a "case or contro-
versy," at all. 22 The moment that answer was filed the district court
should have dismissed the case, as it was then framed, for lack of juris-
diction. Retaining jurisdiction to rule on the issues subsequently decided
smacks of the Supreme Court's shenanigans of the Lochner era in cases
like Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 2 3 which struck down a federal tax whose
only defender before the Court was the corporation on which the chal-
lenged tax was being imposed.
A common element of arguments by those favoring a greater role
for courts in shaping public policy is impatience with jurisdictional limi-
tations such as the ban on collusive lawsuits. Such advocates have a par-
ticular loathing for requirements governing standing, which fix the
criteria a plaintiff must meet in order to bring a suit in the federal courts.
The reason is clear enough. The fewer restrictions there are on the kinds
of disputes over which courts have jurisdiction, the greater the power of
the courts. But it is well known that the framers of the Constitution
specifically rejected the concept of a "council of revision," a council of
judges which, in addition to the president, would have veto power on
constitutional grounds over all legislation. 24 Abandoning jurisdictional
limitations is the road to creating a system in which any citizen can chal-
20. Strauss, supra note 16, at 597.
21. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 375 n.1.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64-66 (3d ed. 1986).
23. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
24. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14-15 (1 1th ed. 1985).
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lenge any piece of legislation to which he objects. It is the road to creat-
ing the council of revision the framers rejected.
Congress of course has the power to expand the concept of standing
to some as yet undefined extent. But Congress expanding standing is one
thing; courts doing it without congressional approval is something quite
different. The difference is between the democratically responsible
branches of government enlarging the power of courts and the democrat-
ically unresponsive judges pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps
to expand their own power.
Whatever one thinks of Professor Shane's argument that the framers
intended courts to reform policy in the guise of constitutional adjudica-
tion, one thing remains clear. There is no evidence of any kind whatso-
ever to suggest that the framers intended the courts to be anything but
courts: agencies to resolve concrete disputes between adverse parties
both of whom have a real stake in the outcome.
B. Constitutional Violation
To say that the conditions in Alabama mental health institutions at
the time of Wyatt were deplorable is an understatement; they were abom-
inable. Patients were literally being killed by other patients; the food was
close to a starvation diet and was prepared under incredibly unsanitary
conditions.2 5 So no argument will be made here that confining people
under such circumstances is not unconstitutional.
But that was not the constitutional violation on which the trial judge
based his subsequent orders. Indeed, since the facts recited in the preced-
ing paragraph were never mentioned in any of the four opinions the trial
judge wrote, they would appear to be irrelevant! The reason the trial
judge did not focus on this uncontested constitutional violation is obvi-
ous: it would not have justified the elaborate management order he later
entered.
The constitutional violations the trial judge actually found were two
in number. First, he held that mentally ill patients "have a constitutional
right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of them a
realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condi-
tion," and he found that the existing programs were "scientifically and
medically inadequate" to meet that standard. 26 Second, he held that
mentally retarded patients "have a constitutional right to receive such
individual habilitation as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to
25. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1310-12.
26. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. at 784.
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lead a more useful and meaningful life and to return to society. "27
As to the first of these alleged rights, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial judge's holding on the basis of its own opinion in
another case it had recently decided, Donaldson v. O'Connor.2 In Don-
aldson, the court of appeals had announced essentially the same con-
stitutional doctrine as the trial court did in Wyatt.29 But Donaldson
thereafter went to the Supreme Court.30 That Court vacated the judg-
ment on the ground that "the difficult issues of constitutional law dealt
with by the Court of Appeals [i.e., the constitutional right to treatment]
are not presented by this case."'3' To this day, the Supreme Court has
never approved the constitutional right to treatment doctrine, probably
because of the enormous difficulties with it that were reviewed compel-
lingly in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Donaldson .32
As to the second alleged right found by the trial court and affirmed
on appeal in Wyatt, the constitutional right of retardates to such "habili-
tation as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to lead a more
useful and meaningful life," the Supreme Court has since squarely con-
sidered and flatly rejected it. Youngberg v. Romeo 33 held that confined
retardates have a constitutional right only to a safe environment, free-
dom from bodily restraint, and "such training as may be reasonable" to
protect those two interests.
The upshot of Wyatt, then, is an elaborately detailed and expensive
order based on two alleged constitutional rights, one of which clearly
does not exist and the other of which is highly suspect. As to the latter,
indeed, the Fifth Circuit, which created the right to treatment in Donald-
son and invoked it to affirm Wyatt, has since repudiated it. 34 So Wyatt is
left with no constitutional foundation at all, except the one the trial judge
ignored because it was inadequate to accomplish the goal he had in mind.
Lest one mistakenly suppose that Wyatt is in this respect an aberra-
tion in the galaxy of judicial activism, two other examples may be men-
tioned briefly. In Harris v. McRae,35 the Supreme Court upheld a law
(the "Hyde Amendment") forbidding the expenditure of federal funds
27. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 390.
28. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
29. See id. at 520 ("We hold that a person involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental
hospital has a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable
opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.").
30. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
31. Id. at 573.
32. Id. at 578-89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
33. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
34. See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1972).
35. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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for abortions. But roughly eighteen months earlier, a federal district
judge, no doubt employing an "aspirational" 36 view of the Constitution,
had invalidated the law and enjoined the government from withholding
the funds. How do taxpayers recoup the money unlawfully expended
under this order?
In the second example, Nicholas "Slick" Romano pleaded guilty to
drug offenses and was put on probation by a state judge. When Romano
later was charged with another crime, the state judge revoked his proba-
tion and sentenced him to prison, in the process complying with all of the
Supreme Court's requirements regarding probation revocation. But a
federal judge nevertheless ordered Romano released on a habeas corpus
petition. In Black v. Romano,37 the Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed. But Romano had meanwhile disappeared and as of this writing is
still at large. How does society protect itself from convicted criminals
freed by federal judicial orders that. have no lawful basis?
Perhaps a persuasive case can be made for the proposition that soci-
ety is required to bear such onerous burdens38 imposed by judges in the
name of non-existent constitutional rights in order to permit activist
courts leeway to engage in "policy reform." If so, I have yet to hear it.
C. Selecting the Remedy
The abominable conditions that existed in Alabama's mental health
institutions at the time of Wyatt were plainly unconstitutional. Where
confinement under the challenged circumstances is unconstitutional,
there is an obvious and ancient remedy: release by writ of habeas corpus.
Given the facts of Wyatt, release would seem to have been the most ap-
propriate remedy. The evidence that seventy percent of the inmates in
one of the institutions should never have been committed in the first
place39 strengthens this conclusion substantially.
Professor Shane reports that "release is never the remedy of first
resort. This can only be," he adds, "because courts recognize a proper
place in the remedial process for balancing remedial interests against
other legitimate social concerns."4° That may be true in a few cases. On
the whole, however, I believe courts avoid ordering release for a quite
36. Shane, supra note 6, at 550, passim.
37. 471 U.S. 606 (1985).
38. The matter was disputed, but the state estimated that complying with the Wyatt order
would consume sixty percent of the state's entire budget except for school financing, and would
require capital improvements of $75,000,000. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1317.
39. Id. at 1310.
40. Shane, supra note 6, at 557.
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different reason. If a court ever ordered the wholesale release of an insti-
tution full of the mentally ill, or convicted criminals, on the ground that
conditions in the institution were unconstitutional, then the full import
of the real power the democratically unresponsible federal judges in fact
exercise would be brought home to all citizens with a vengeance. Prior
uproars about judicial activism would be as tempests in teapots by com-
parison. Debates over the difference between the truly unconstitutional
and the aspirationally unconstitutional would no longer be confined to
largely-inaccessible, arcane law reviews. Judicial opinions supporting
such orders would be studied with care by large numbers of people, not
just by scholars and advocates. In sum, I believe that release is never the
remedy of first resort largely because that tactic protects judicial power
by camouflaging it, making it appear less extensive and less threatening
to democratic government than it is.
And so the trial judge in Wyatt did not order release. The full flavor
of the order he did enter is impossible to capture in a summary. It covers
eight printed pages and is divided into five major sections.41 Besides defi-
nitions, it contains thirty-five paragraphs, some with as many as sixteen
subparagraphs, and some subparagraphs with as many as five sub-sub-
paragraphs. It lists thirty-five different kinds of employees, ranging from
psychiatrists and psychologists to messengers (!) and vehicle drivers (!!),
and how many of each, every Alabama institution was ordered to have
on its staff. It contains detailed instructions with respect to physical fa-
cilities-how hot the water must be (1 lOF at the fixture), for example.
And so on-and on.
The point at issue is to try to relate these detailed decrees to some
constitutional violation. Dealing with all, or even most, of these specifi-
cations is obviously impossible, so a few examples will have to suffice.
Under the heading "Humane Psychological and Physical Environ-
ment" 42 are these two provisions of the order: (1) "the toilets will be
installed in separate stalls to ensure privacy,"'43 and (2) "adequate heat-
ing [and] air conditioning ... systems and equipment shall be afforded
.... Such facilities shall insure that the temperature in the hospital shall
not exceed 83F nor fall below 68F.' 44
No one will claim that such amenities are not desirable. The issue,
however, is whether people involuntarily housed in an institution without
them are being confined unconstitutionally.
41. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 379-86.





I spent roughly four years in the armed forces, about half that time
living in barracks in this country (i.e., not in combat zones or overseas) at
a time when air conditioning was available. I was never in a barracks
(and I was in plenty of them, including many in the South) that had
either of these amenities. Is there a legitimate theory of constitutional
interpretation that allows a judge to hold that the same living conditions
that are routinely imposed on people serving their country are unconsti-
tutional when they are imposed on prisoners, or, as in this case, the men-
tally ill? I believe not. Nor do I believe there is a legitimate theory of
interpretation that allows judges to decree that the Constitution requires
a thing just because the thing happens to be desirable. Like so many of
the decrees making judges dictators of public institutions, the Wyatt de-
cree simply substituted what appeared to be desirable for what the Con-
stitution requires. "Dictators" rather than "managers" of public
institutions because managers do not make the rules, dictators do. And
"substitute" rather than "confuse" what is desirable for what the Consti-
tution requires because, with some exceptions doubtless, the judges are
not confused; they know full well what they are doing.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Chicago reapportionment case is not really an example of fed-
eral courts managing public institutions. Once the redistricting map was
drawn, the court's involvement was at an end. The court was required to
pay considerable attention to the details of that map, to be sure, but that
was inevitable, assuming the validity of both the one person, one vote
standard and of the amendments to the Voting Rights Act.
The patronage case raises the issue of creating non-existent constitu-
tional rights in a more debatable context. The creation of the Civil Ser-
vice system is considered by most historians to be one of the highlights of
the history of this nation. The Supreme Court now reveals, in the cases
reviewed by Professor Strauss, that its most important feature-viz., pro-
tection from being fired for belonging to the wrong political party-was
contained in the first amendment all the time. All we ever had to do was
file a lawsuit and ask a court to announce the fact.
Professor Shane describes this as "changed understandings of an un-
changed Constitution. ' 4 He asserts that it is legitimate. I think very
recent history proves that almost everyone's common sense tells them the
contrary.
45. Shane, supra note 6, at 552.
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Consider the debate in the United States Senate last May over the
ratification of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. At
issue was an amendment stipulating that presidents were without power
to interpret the Treaty in any way different from that in which the execu-
tive branch had explained its provisions at the time of its consideration
by the Senate-unless the Senate subsequently approved. That amend-
ment was prompted by what many thought was the executive branch's
reinterpretation of the earlier Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The
amendment passed overwhelmingly. 46
Is that not the common sense of the matter? When individuals (Sen-
ate/"We the people of the United States") grant power to others (Presi-
dent/government), they expect that power to be limited in the ways they
understood it would be limited; they do not expect the grantee (Presi-
dent/judges) to use the grant as an excuse for inventing powers that were
not granted-unless the individuals agree. And the Constitution pro-
vides a method for people to express their agreement-the amendment
process, which is article V, not article III.
If I understand him correctly, Professor Shane argues that "changed
understandings of an unchanged Constitution" is legitimate because peo-
ple have come to expect it (or, perhaps, to be resigned to it). That argu-
ment is what former Senator Thomas Eagleton called, in another
context, the "bank robber proposition." Senator Eagleton's context was
the debate over the president's use of the war powers. He was answering
an argument that the history of presidential use of the war powers over
200 years put a practical "gloss on the Constitution," and thereby en-
larged the president's powers; and this was true whether or not those
prior presidential uses were constitutional. This argument is what he
characterized as the bank robber proposition. To quote him directly:
"[If a number of bank robbers proved successful, the act of bank robbery
would have to be legalized."' 47 That is the essence of Professor Shane's
argument, as I understand it, except that he is dealing with federal judges
rather than the president: because judges have consistently usurped
power in the past and people have come to expect it, judges may consti-
tutionally usurp power.
Even supposing the validity of judges creating new constitutional
rights by resort to one or another of the Constitution's general provi-
sions, the legitimacy of their managing public institutions on a continu-
ing basis still requires some linkage between the alleged right and the
46. See 134 CONG. REC. S6724-84 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
47. T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 125 n.* (1974).
1988]
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remedy that puts the judge in control. In the process of admirably dem-
onstrating the complexity of this relationship, Professor Shane offers a
textbook example of the extraordinary dangers of according judges that
kind of authority. Discussing what the court might have done in the
public housing case, he nonchalantly suggests that "the court might have
considered the relocation of some existing tenants to accomplish the de-
segregation of existing public housing."'48
Ponder that if you please! Desegregating public housing is simple.
A judge merely orders some black families and some white families to
exchange residences! The hopes and fears, the longings and aspirations
of those families, black and white, obviously are of no concern.
Invincible self-rectitude is the hallmark of judicial activism, an atti-
tude that judges are better qualified than other mortals to articulate the
principles and formulate the policies by which this nation will be
governed.
I prefer the philosophy of the late Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone,
as summarized in two sentences of a famous dissenting opinion:
[The arguments of the majority] are addressed to the mind accustomed
to believe that it is the business of courts to sit in judgment on the
wisdom of legislative action. Courts are not the only agency of govern-
ment that must be assumed to have capacity to govern.49
Shortly after Chief Justice Stone uttered these words, the Court adopted
his philosophy as its guiding principle-for a time. All courts should
return to that philosophy soon.
48. Shane, supra note 6, at 570.
49. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). See Gerard, Capacity
to Govern, 12 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 501 (1989).
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